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1 Introduction
Firms and other organizations often use dynamic tournaments to incentivize re-
peated effort provision.2 For instance, promotion tournaments and bonus sys-
tems are common. When designing such contests, a principal must ask how to
induce the best possible intertemporal effort vector with a given budget. She can
affect total effort and its distribution across periods though the prize structure,
i.e., the division of a given prize sum between several periods. She can give one
big prize after a long time or several small prizes in different periods. Apart from
this prize policy, she has an alternative instrument for influencing the intertem-
poral effort distribution, namely the weight she gives to past performance when
assigning prizes in later periods. We will show that, in spite of their superficial
similarity, this weight policy and the prize policy have very different effects on
effort streams, and we will identify the optimal combination of both instruments.
Specifically, we consider a two-period rank-order tournament with two risk-
neutral agents with identical and known abilities.3 The principal can split the
prize money across two periods arbitrarily. If she awards a second-period prize,
she also chooses a first-period performance weight. After the announcement of
prize and weight policies, the agents choose effort levels in each period. The
principal observes each agent’s performance, a noisy measure of effort. In pe-
riod 1, she awards the prize (if any) to the agent who performed better. In our
benchmark case with feedback, she publicly announces the performance of both
agents in the first period. In period 2, the agents choose efforts again. The prin-
cipal then allocates the second-period prize to the agent for whom the weighted
sum of first- and second-period performance is highest.
In line with the literature, we consider the case that a principal regards efforts
in different periods and by different agents as perfect substitutes and thus maxi-
mizes total effort. Contrary to most of the literature, we also analyze the optimal
policy for a principal who treats efforts in different periods as imperfect sub-
stitutes and wants to balance them across periods. This is important, because
2Awell-known argument for tournaments is as follows.When performance is not verifiable, a
principal who contracts directly on performance may claim that performance was low to save on
performance pay. Tournaments reduce this incentive, because the total payments to the agents
are independent of performance.
3To see the incentive effects of such tournaments most clearly, we abstract from the important
issue of selecting the agent with the highest innate ability for a particular task.
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excessively low efforts in some period may cause large harm, which cannot even
be compensated by an extremely large effort in other periods.
Our main contribution is that we compare the effects of prize and weight
policies on effort streams. Moreover, we identify the optimal combination of
both policies, depending on parameters. We use a simple example to show that
a principal can induce the same maximal first-period effort and the same maxi-
mal second-period effort with each instrument. However, the two instruments
implement different sets of effort vectors with positive efforts in both periods.
Next, we show that, under quite general conditions, the principal should give
only a second-period prize, but with a positive first-period performance weight.
The optimal first-period prize is positive only if the first-period performance
measure is sufficiently precise. We then show that for quadratic cost functions
and normally distributed observation errors, this condition never holds. Even
with more general distributional assumptions, the optimal first-period prize is
never higher than the second-period prize for imperfect substitutes and quadratic
cost functions.
For the normal-quadratic example, we identify large gains from good design.
The expected effort is at least 40% higher when a principal chooses prizes and
weights optimally than when she carries out two identical independent tourna-
ments with the same total prize sum.
Finally, we compare the results of the benchmark model with the no feed-
back case without communication of performance.4 We obtain similar results on
the optimal combination of prizes and weights. Moreover, we generalize some
existing results on whether a principle should give feedback.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses related lit-
erature. In Section 3, we introduce the model. In Section 4, we analyze agent
behavior. Section 5 uses a simple example to compare the incentive effects of
pure prize policies and pure weight policies. Sections 6 and 7 characterize the
optimal policy. Section 8 discusses the feedback policy. Section 9 concludes. The
Appendix contains all non-trivial proofs.
4In the no revelation case, the game is static. The model thus becomes a special case of a
multi-battle contest where agents compete simultaneously in a multiplicity of dimensions (see,
e.g., Clark and Konrad 2007 and Kovenock and Roberson 2010).
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2 Relation to the Literature
Our paper focusses on the optimal choice of prizes and weights in dynamic tour-
naments.5 We are not aware of any work on the trade-off between these two
instruments and their optimal combination. A small number of papers (Möller
2012, Clark et al. 2012, Clark and Nilsson 2013) derives the optimal prize struc-
ture in Tullock contests when good performers in period one have an exogenous
advantage in period two, creating an asymmetry between the agents in the sec-
ond period.6 However, these papers do not deal with the choice between prize
and weight policies as alternatives for influencing the effort streams, which is
central in our paper. Moreover, they neither analyze feedback policies nor do
they allow for imperfect substitutes.7
Our results on optimal weights are closely related to the literature, but they
provide additional insights. For instance, Meyer (1992) considers a setting sim-
ilar to our case with feedback and a single prize, but with risk-averse agents.
She shows that cost minimization requires a bias towards the first-period win-
ner.8 Our analysis shows that the principal should also give a headstart when the
first-period prize is higher than the second-period prize, when efforts are imper-
fect substitutes and when there is no feedback. Finally, we provide results on the
determinants of the size of the bias.9
Several recent papers have dealt with feedback in dynamic tournaments (see
Section 8). Aoyagi (2010) considers a two-period tournament similar to ours.
However, he takes prizes and weights as exogenous: Unlike in our paper, there is
5Nitzan (1994) and Konrad (2009) provide surveys of the literature on tournaments. Another
broadly related literature analyzes dynamic principal-agent relationships with moral hazard in
a non-competitive setting. Lewis and Sappington (1997) examine how current incentives should
optimally depend on past performance. Hansen (2013) and Chen and Chiu (2013) deal with the
optimal revelation policy.
6These technological assumptions are also made by some authors who do not deal with the
optimal prize structure (e.g., Schmitt et al. 2004, Grossmann and Dietl 2009, Grossmann 2011 and
Baik and Lee 2000).
7Some papers derive the optimal distribution of prize money across stages in a two-period
elimination tournament, where only the winners of the current period compete again in the next
period. A seminal paper is Moldovanu and Sela (2006). Because elimination tournaments have a
very different structure than our model, the results are difficult to compare to ours.
8See also Harbaugh and Ridlon (2011) and Ridlon and Shin (2013).
9Contrary to us, Meyer (1992) assumes that the size of the bias is fixed ex ante rather than a
function of the performance difference in period 1.
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only one prize, and first and second-period performance receive the sameweight.
He shows that the expected effort is higher (lower) with feedback if marginal
costs are concave (convex).10 We endogenize Aoyagi’s assumptions on prizes
and weights by analyzing under which circumstances the principal optimally
chooses them in this way. Moreover, we show that the optimal feedback pol-
icy has the same features when these assumptions do not hold. Ederer (2010)
introduces incomplete information about ability. The results are equivalent to
those of Aoyagi (2010) if ability is non-complementary to effort.11 With comple-
mentarity, expected efforts may be higher with feedback than without, even for
quadratic costs.12
Like us, Gershkov and Perry (2009) ask how a sequence of performance sig-
nals in a two-period setting should translate into prizes. The paper is hard to
compare with ours, because the assumptions differ considerably. Most impor-
tantly, the authors assume that the principal can only use coarse information for
interim performance evaluation (which, if any, agent was better).13 Contrary to
us, they do not ask whether and how the principal should spread a given prize
sum over two periods. Instead, they investigate properties of the optimal mech-
anism when the principal can not only vary the prize distribution, but also the
prize sum. Allowing such flexibility makes sense in their set-up (contrary to
ours), because they assume performance to be verifiable, so that the principal is
not tempted to report low performance (and thus pay low prizes).14
In brief, our paper contributes to the literature by showing how a principal
10Aoyagi (2010) allows for general objective functions of the principal and for partial feed-
back. Denter and Sisak (2013) show that effort may increase with feedback if marginal efforts
are concave. They use their set-up to analyze the effect of polls on political campaign spending,
allowing for an initial asymmetry before the beginning of the first period.
11Ederer and Fehr (2013) use a special case of this model with equal abilities.
12Other papers address feedback in dynamic tournaments under very different assumptions.
Arbatskaya and Mialon (2012) analyze a lottery contest where first- and second-period efforts
are complements. Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) consider a contest in which the agents either
succeed or fail, and the prize is given to the agent who succeeded more often. Zhang and Wang
(2009) consider dynamic all-pay auctions with elimination.
13Also, Gershkov and Perry (2009) assume that the relation between winning probabilities and
efforts is the same in both periods, while we allow for differences in the error structure. Finally,
they only focus on maximization of total effort. Contrary to us, they allow for a technological
relation between first-period effort and second-period performance.
14Like us, Gershkov and Perry (2009) have some results (e.g. Theorem 2) which are consistent
with first-period efforts receiving positive weights. While they consider settings with and with-
out midterm review, they do not directly analyze the ceteris paribus effect of giving feedback.
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should use prizes and weights to affect effort streams. Moreover, it provides
robustness results regarding weight and feedback policies, and it justifies some
assumptions previously used in the literature.
3 The Model
We consider a class of two-stage rank-order tournaments. Given a fixed budget
W > 0, a principal chooses an incentive system I = (η,W1, ρ) ∈ R+ × [0,W ]×
{0, 1} to be explained below.15 Given I , agents i ∈ {1, 2} choose effort levels
eit ≥ 0 (t ∈ {1, 2}). The cost function Kit (eit) has the following properties:
Assumption 1: Kit is independent of i and differentiable three times. It satis-
fies K ′it > 0, K
′′
it > 0, Kit (0) = K
′
it (0) = 0. K
′′′
it (eit) ≥ 0 or K ′′′it (eit) ≤ 0 must
hold globally.
Thus, we can write Kt ≡ Kit. Note that we allow first- and second-period
cost functions to differ, reflecting potential differences in the two tasks.
The agents maximize expected utility and are risk-neutral. Utility is addi-
tively separable in period-specific income and costs. At the end of each pe-
riod t, the principal observes performance, which is an imperfect effort measure
sit = eit + εit. The error term εit is independently distributed across agents and
periods. In each period, the error distribution is the same for agent 1 as for agent
2. However, the error distribution in period 1 may differ from the one in period
2. This captures possible differences in the precision of monitoring for the two
tasks.16
The principal awards the first-period prize W1 to agent i if si1 > sj1. Agent
i receives the second-period prize W2 = W − W1 if si2 + ηsi1 > sj2 + ηsj1.
The principal’s choice of the first-period weight η ∈ R+ thus determines the
influence of past performance on the chance of winning in the second period.
Under a full feedback policy (ρ = 1), the principal makes the performance
15In Klein and Schmutzler (2014), we allow for η < 0, but we show that this would never
be optimal. Every η < 0 is dominated by |η|, because |η| will turn out to provide the same
second-period incentives while strengthening first-period incentives.
16In a non-tournament setting, Ke et al. (2014) show that organizations optimally hire workers
into easy-to-monitor jobs with low effort costs and then promote them into difficult-to-monitor
jobs with high (marginal and absolute) effort costs. In our setting, this would correspond to
σ1 < σ2 and K1 (e) < K2 (e), K ′1 (e) < K ′2 (e).
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of both agents public before they choose second-period efforts.17 Under a no-
feedback policy (ρ = 0), the principal does not communicate the performance
assessment. She does not even communicate who won the first-period prize,
and she distributes both prizes at the end of period 2. In the following, we shall
focus on the full feedback policy; except in Section 8.
The following notation is helpful to describe the solution of the game.
Definition 1 The error difference of agent i in period t (t = 1, 2) is ∆εit =
εit−εjt. His relative first-period performance is∆si1 = si1−sj1 = ∆ei1+∆εit,
where ∆eit = eit − ejt.
Clearly, ∆eit = −∆ejt, ∆εit = −∆εjt, ∆si1 = −∆sj1. We make the follow-
ing assumption on the error distributions:
Assumption 2 ∆εit is distributed as Ft (s) on R with a symmetric, single-
peaked, strictly positive and continuously differentiable density ft (s).
This implies ft (s) = ft (−s), f ′t (s) = −f ′t (−s) and E (∆εit) = 0.
For some results, we assume quadratic cost functions:
(C1) The cost function is Kt (eit) = kt2 (eit)
2 with kt > 0.
We assume that, given a fixed prize budget, the principal’s payoff is increasing
in efforts. The efforts of different agents within periods are perfect substitutes for
the principal. We allow first- and second period efforts to be perfect or imperfect
substitutes. For perfect substitutes, the principal chooses the incentive system so
as to maximize expected total efforts. For imperfect substitutes, she maximizes
the expected product of first and second-period efforts. This corresponds to a
complementarity that makes it desirable to have similar efforts in both periods.
4 Agent behavior
We focus on the full feedback policy, deferring the no feedback policy to Section
8. We first analyze the agents’ equilibrium behavior for a given incentive system.
The following simple result is stated without proof.
17In practice, the principal will typically not communicate a concrete number. Instead, shemay
communicate whatever relevant information she has to the agents, thereby creating a common
understanding about their relative performance.
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Lemma 1 (i)The conditional probability that si1 > sj1 given ei1 and ej1 isF1 (ei1 − ej1).
(ii) The conditional probability that si2 + ηsi1 > sj2 + ηsj1 given ei2, ej2 and∆si1
is F2 (η∆si1 + ei2 − ej2).
4.1 General Analysis
In period 2, a player’s information set consists of all combinations of period 1
efforts and error differences that are consistent with the own first-period effort
ei1 and the observed relative performance ∆si1. We use the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) to deal with this imperfect information (Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
p. 285).18 A pure strategy σi of player i consists of a first-period choice ei1 and
a function Ei2 mapping information sets (ei1,∆si1) to actions ei2. If player i
chose ei1, observes ∆si1 and assumes that player j plays the pure strategy σj =
(ej1, Ej2), he will assign probability one to the event that ∆εi1 = ∆si1 − ∆ei1.
We will assume that beliefs are formed in this way, without further mention.
4.1.1 Second-period efforts
Using Lemma 1(ii), the expected second-period payoff of agent i, conditional on
relative first-period performance and second-period efforts, is
Ui2 (ei2, ej2,∆si1) = F2 (η∆si1 +∆ei2)W2 −K2 (ei2) . (1)
Thus, the first period effort influences the second-period payoff via the first-
period relative performance ∆si1. The first-order condition is
f2(η∆si1 +∆ei2)W2 = K
′
2 (ei2) . (2)
Though the game does not have any proper subgames because information sets
in period 2 are not singletons, payoffs in period 2 are constant on information
sets. We use this in the following definition.
Definition 2 The second-period effort game induced by ∆si1 is the game with
18The task is simplified because there are no off-equilibrium events to consider, as f1 is strictly
positive on R. Moreover, period 1 enters player i’s payoffs only via ∆si1 and ei1, so that the
unobservable aspects of previous play (player j’s effort choices) are irrelevant for the players’
choices.
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players i = 1, 2, strategy spaces Xi = R+ and payoffs given by (1) for (ei2, ej2) ∈
Xi ×Xj .
We obtain the following result:
Lemma 2 Suppose ρ = 1 (feedback) and W2 > 0.
(i) In any equilibrium of the second-period effort game, efforts for i = 1, 2 are
symmetric and satisfy
e∗i2 (∆si1) ≡ e∗i2 (∆si1; η,W2, 1) = (K ′2)
−1
[f2 (η∆si1)W2] (3)
(ii) If costs are sufficiently convex, (3) defines the unique Nash equilibrium of the
second-period effort game.
Lemma 2 has some simple comparative statics implications.
Corollary 1 Suppose ρ = 1, η > 0 and W2 > 0. Then e∗i2 is decreasing in |∆si1|
and η, and increasing in W2 for i = 1, 2.
The result on |∆si1| states that a greater performance difference between the
leader (the agent i with ∆si1 > 0) and the laggard (the agent with ∆si1 < 0)
reduces both players’ effort in period 2.19 The other two results identify policy
effects. In particular, increasing the first-period weight η reduces second-period
efforts.
In the PBE, the symmetric second-period equilibrium of the effort game is
played after each realization of ∆si1. Thus, the expected second-period payoff,
conditional on first-period performance, is







The expected second-period payoff, given first-period efforts, is
U ei2 (ei1, ej1) ≡ E∆εi1U si2 (∆ei1 +∆εi1) . (5)
19This result reflects the ”well-known evaluation effect or lack-of-competition effect” (Ederer
2010, p. 742). It implies that the principal has an incentive to always report equal performances.
This problem becomes negligible if the principal leaves the communication to disinterested par-
ties from within or outside the organization.
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4.1.2 First-period efforts
Using Lemma 1(i), agent i’s optimization problem in period 1 is
max
ei1≥0
F1 (ei1 − ej1)W1 + U ei2 (ei1, ej1)−K1 (ei1) .




= K ′1 (ei1) . (6)
The following definition is crucial for the intuition.




f2 (ηs) f1 (s) ds.
The logic of this definition is as follows. For each agent, f1 (s) captures the
density of the event that the relative first-period performance of this player is s
when efforts are symmetric (as in equilibrium). Since both players choose iden-
tical equilibrium efforts in the second period, f2 (ηs) = f2 (−ηs) captures the
density of the event that a strike of luck of one agent in period 2 exactly com-
pensates a strike of luck of the other agent of size s in period 1. Therefore, C(η)
measures the probability of the event that the second-period contest is a close run
where a marginal effort increase of one agent will tip the balance of the second-
period contest in his favor: When C(η) is high, an agent who was lucky in the
first period cannot be too sure about his winning prospects in the second period,
and will therefore continue to put in some effort. C(η) has simple properties.
First,
C ′(η) = 2
∫ ∞
0
sf ′2 (ηs) f1 (s) ds < 0 for η > 0. (7)
An increase in η thus weakens second-period competition. Moreover,
(i) C (η) > 0; (ii) C (0) = f2 (0) ; (iii) C ′(0) = 0 (8)
We sometimes invoke a regularity condition to simplify the interpretation:
(C2) ηC(η) is increasing in η.
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This condition holds, for instance, in Example E1 below. The following result
uses (6) to derive equilibrium efforts:
Proposition 1 Suppose ρ = 1 (feedback).
(i) In any symmetric interior PBE, first-period efforts satisfy




[f1 (0)W1 + ηW2C(η)] . (9)
(ii) Suppose the cost functions are sufficiently convex. Then (3) and (9) describe the
unique symmetric PBE strategies.
We defer the discussion of second-order conditions to the appendix; there we
will show that they require sufficiently convex cost functions.
By Proposition 1, if (C2) holds, a higher η induces higher first-period effort.
The term in brackets on the right-hand side of (9) is the marginal benefit from
increasing ei1. The effect on the expected first-period payoff is f1 (0)W1; the
effect on the expected second-period payoff is ηW2C(η), which is positive if η >
0. This term reflects the direct effect of higher first-period effort on second-period
winning chances. The term does not capture strategic effects on the future efforts
of the other player. Such effects are relevant in the game, but they cancel out in
the symmetric equilibrium.20
We now characterize second-period efforts. Symmetry of the equilibrium in
Proposition 1 implies ∆si1 = ∆εi1. Using (3) and taking the expectation over
∆εi1, we obtain:
Corollary 2 The expected efforts in period 2 in the PBE of the feedback game de-
scribed in Proposition 1 are





[f2 (ηs)W2] f1 (s) ds (10)
20If, for any first-period effort choice, a player knew hewas ahead of the other player, he would
have a strategic incentive to increase efforts to discourage player j from exerting effort in the
future, whereas the converse would hold for a player who knows he is behind the opponent.
Since the game is stochastic, players have to consider the expected strategic effects, which can
be positive or negative, but cancel out for identical first-period efforts.
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4.2 A Normal-Quadratic Example
To obtain sharper results, we introduce a simple example.
Example E1:The cost function isKt (eit) = k2e
2
it for t = 1, 2. The error differ-
ence ∆εit is normally distributed with variance σ2t .
21
Example E1 satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.




























Lower marginal costs, higher second-period prize, lower first-period weight
and higher first- and second-period precision induce higher second-period efforts.
Analogous results hold for period one. First-period efforts also increase if the
second-period precision increases: The parameter changemakes first-period effort
more worthwhile, because the positive effect on winning the second-period prize
increases. Finally, a redistribution of the prize sum from period 2 to period 1 in-
creases first-period efforts, because the positive effect of an increase in the first-
period prize is always stronger than the negative effect of an identical decrease
in the second-period prize.
5 Prizes vs. Weights: An illustration
We now use Example E1 to illustrate the fundamental difference between prize
and weight policies that makes it worthwile to study the optimal combination of
both instruments. We first ask which effort combinations can be implemented
with a total budget W with two independent tournaments (η = 0) with prizes
W1 and W2 = W − W1. In this case, we speak of a pure prize policy. Second,
we ask which effort combinations can be implemented with a pure weight policy,
that is, with only one (second-period) prize (W1 = 0 and W2 = W ), but arbi-
trary first-period weights η. We formulate the analysis for the feedback policy,
21A normally distributed error difference follows, for example, from normally distributed ob-
servation errors.
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but Corollary 6 below will show that an analogous argument works for the no
feedback policy.22
For the purposes of this illustration, we assume that cost functions and per-
formance measures are identical across periods. Our first result seems to confirm
that there is no difference between prize and weight policies.
Observation 1: In Example E1 with σ1 = σ2 = σ, we obtain:
(i) A pure prize policy with W1 = W and a pure weight policy with η → ∞ both









(ii) A pure prize policy with W1 = 0 and a pure weight policy with η → 0 both









Thus, the maximal effort that the principal can induce with a pure prize pol-
icy in period 1 is the same as for a pure weight policy; similarly for period 2.
However, the two policies induce very different combinations of more balanced
effort vectors with positive effort levels in both periods.
Observation 2: Independent of the prize distribution, the total expected effort




2π . For a pure weight policy, the total expected






η2 + 1 .
Figure 1 illustrates the observations. It depicts all effort vectors that can be
implemented with each type of policy for σ = 1, k = 1 and W = 1.
Reflecting Observation 1, both lines intersect the axes in the same point. The
set of implementable effort vectors for a pure prize policy is a straight line with
slope −1, whereas for a pure weight policy it is a line that is concave to the
origin. The figure also shows the principal’s indifference curves with perfect and
imperfect substitutes, respectively. The figure demonstrates that the advantages
of weight policies for effort provision are particularly pronounced for balanced
efforts (η = 1). These figures also imply that it is optimal for the principal to
induce such balanced efforts in the symmetric example, even when efforts are
perfect substitutes.
Intuitively, starting from an effort vector with all efforts concentrated in one
period, the opportunity costs of inducing small positive effort levels in the other
period are smaller with a weight policy than with a prize policy. Consider for
22Note that, since we focus on symmetric equilibria, and efforts within periods are perfect
substitutes, we can write the principal’s objective in terms of the efforts of only one agent here
and in the following sections.
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1 Implementable efforts for prize policies
2 Implementable efforts for weight policies
3 Indifference curve for perfect substitutes
4 Indifference curve for imperfect substitutes
Figure 1: Implementable effort vectors for prize and weight policies
instance the first-order condition in period 2, which is e2 = W2C (0) /k =
W2f2 (0) /k under a pure prize policy. Thus, inducing higher first-period efforts
by marginally increasingW1 has the opportunity cost that second-period efforts
fall by f2 (0) /k, a positive constant that is independent of W1. Under a pure
weight policy, the first-order condition becomes e2 = WC (η) /k, so that the
opportunity cost of marginally increasing η is a reduction of the second-period
effort by WC ′ (η) /k, which depends directly on the resulting reduction in com-
petition. As C ′ (0) is zero, the reduction in competition is negligible when one
starts from a situation without first-period effort. The argument for the case
without second-period effort is analogous.
In this special case, the principal prefers pure weight policies to pure prize
policies. However, under more general conditions, positive first-period prizes
will have a role to play, even though, at least for perfect substitutes, strong con-
ditions are necessary for principals to benefit from offering two prizes.
14
6 Optimal Policy: Quadratic Cost Functions
For the case of quadratic costs, we first characterize the optimal policy for perfect
and imperfect intertemporal effort substitutes, respectively.23 Then we illustrate
the size of the benefits resulting from an optimal design of the incentive system.
We fix the total budget as W , so that W2 = W −W1.
6.1 Perfect Substitutes
The principal’s objective function for perfect substitutes is:
V P (η,W1, ρ) ≡ e∗1 (η,W1,W −W1) + E (e∗2 (η,W −W1, ρ)) . (13)
Thefirstmain result characterizes the optimal policy. It is a special case of Lemma
5, which is stated for general cost functions (see Appendix 10.3 and the discussion
in Section 7.1).24
Proposition 2 Suppose (C1) holds.
(i) If ∃ η ∈ R+ s.t. f1 (0) < (k1 /k2 + η)C(η), then the optimal first-period prize







k1 /k2 + η
. (14)
(ii) If f1 (0) ≥ (k1 /k2 + η)C(η) ∀ η ∈ R+, W P1 = W .
The result implies that it is always optimal to give only one prize. To see this,
note that, if (C1) holds, efforts in each period are linear functions of the prize in
that period. As efforts are perfect substitutes, the principal focuses on the period
for which the effect of the prize on the effort is higher.
When the principal gives a second-period prize, η is determined by (14),
which captures the trade-off between strengthening first-period incentives and
23In the following discussion, we assume that, for given error distributions and effort cost
functions, second-order conditions hold for all allowable choices of the policy variables. This is
for instance true for Example E1.
24We discuss Lemma 5 briefly below.
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weakening second-period competition.25 As the right-hand side of (14) is downward-
sloping in η, the optimal η falls as a result of any change in the error distribution
that globally increases the sensitivity
∣∣∣C′(η)C(η)
∣∣∣ of second-period competition to η:
As
∣∣∣C′(η)C(η)
∣∣∣ shifts upward, the opportunity cost of using η to increase first-period
efforts (the reduction in future competition) increases. Thus, the principal should
be more reluctant to use this instrument to induce first-period efforts. Figure 2
illustrates Proposition 2 for Example E1. It plots
∣∣∣C′(η)C(η)
∣∣∣ for three different values
of the relative precision of the first- and second-period performance measures.
We see that the optimal weight of first-period performance ηP is higher if the
second-period performance measure is imprecise compared to the first-period
measure.
Figure 2: Necessary conditions for η with perfect substitutes
Furthermore, the higher the ratio of first-period to second-period marginal
costs, the lower is the optimal η. Note also that (14) and thus the optimal η is
independent of W1.26 Nevertheless, one should think of first-period prizes and
weights as substitutes: As W1 increases, W2 = W − W1 falls. Thus, even if η
is unchanged, the marginal effect of higher first-period effort on the expected
25The proof shows that (14) not only holds for the optimal weight/prize combination, but for
the optimal weight corresponding to any positive second-period prize.
26This is due to the fact that W −W1 enters ∂V P (η,W1) /∂η multiplicatively (see (47)).
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future payoff (ηW2C(η)) falls if W1 increases, so that the principal relies less on
the prospects of future prizes to induce first-period efforts.
Corollary 4 specifies the optimal policy for Example E1.
Corollary 4 In E1, W P1 = 0 and ηP = σ22 /σ21 .
Consistent with Proposition 2, it is optimal to give only a second-period prize
with perfect substitutes. Incentives for first-period efforts come exclusively from
η. The result endogenizes the assumption thatW1 = 0 and η= 1 in Aoyagi (2010)
for identically normally distributed error distributions: For σ1 = σ2, this is the
optimal combination of prizes and weights.
6.2 Imperfect Substitutes
The principal’s objective function for imperfect substitutes is
V I (η,W1, ρ) ≡ e∗1 (η,W1,W −W1) · E (e∗2 (η,W −W1, ρ)) . (15)
Obviously, the principal wants to induce efforts in both periods. We can charac-
terize the optimal policy for quadratic costs and, in particular, for the normal-
quadratic example.
Proposition 3 Suppose (C1) holds. The optimal
(
W I1 , η
I
)
satisfies one of the fol-
lowing properties:













2f1 (0)− 2ηIC (ηI)











According to Proposition 3, there are two possibilities for
(





picted in Figure 3.
According to (a), the first-period prize may be zero, in which case the opti-
mal first-period weight satisfies a simple condition that depends exclusively on
C (η) (see pointA in Figure 3). As in the case of perfect substitutes, η is lower the
greater its adverse effect on future competition is. By (b), the first-period prize
17
Figure 3: Necessary conditions for imperfect substitutes
may be positive, in which case the optimal first-period weight satisfies a condi-
tion that depends on error distributions not only via C (η), but also via f1 (0)
directly, as captured by W I1 (see point B in Figure 3).27 The error distributions
determine which of the two cases in Proposition 3 applies. For instance, with
normal error distributions, the first-period prize is zero (see Corollary 5 below).
Contrary to the case of perfect substitutes, Proposition 3 does not rule out
positive prizes in both periods. Per-period efforts are linear in prizes, so that
one of the prizes will typically have a more positive effect on total efforts. Nev-
ertheless, the principal should not focus exclusively on this period, because she
wants to balance efforts. On a related note, (b) states that the first-period prize
is smaller than the second-period prize. This differs from perfect substitutes, for
which it can be optimal to induce only first-period efforts. To obtain the desired
balanced effort distribution, the principal should not give excessive first-period
prizes, because she already provides incentives for first-period effort through η.
In E1, we can say more about the optimum.
Corollary 5 In E1, necessary conditions for the optimum are ηI = σ2 /σ1 and
W I1 = 0.
The result resembles Corollary 4 for perfect substitutes, with variances re-
placed by standard deviations. Note that ηI > ηP if and only if σ2 < σ1: Greater
27Note that W I
1
(η) is typically not linear.
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precision of the second-period performance measure leads to higher second-
period efforts than first-period efforts. Imperfect substitutes require balanced
efforts, so that a greater weight of the first period is used to mitigate the asym-
metry.
6.3 The size of the benefits of optimal design
We now use Example E1 to calculate the size of the benefits resulting from an
optimal design of the incentive system with perfect substitutes. We compare the
optimal choice of prizes and weights ((η,W1) = (σ22 /σ21 , 0)) with the case of
two independent and identical tournaments ((η,W1) = (0,W /2)). By optimally




1 , 0)− V P (0,W /2)






2 − (σ1 + σ2)
(σ1 + σ2)
Figure 4 shows how the total relative payoff increase from choosing the optimal
incentive system depends on the standard deviations of the error distributions.
Figure 4: Relative payoff increase when setting W1 and η optimally
∆EP attains its minimum for σ1 = σ2 at
√
2−1 ≈ 41%.Thus, the percentage
payoff increase from implementing the optimal policy is lowest if both perfor-
mance measurements are equally precise. Figure 4 further shows that the more
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precise one of the performance measures is, the more the principal can benefit
from implementing the optimal policy.28
7 Optimal Policy: General cost functions
With more general cost functions, we can still derive conditions for the optimal




Proposition 2 on the optimal weights and prizes for quadratic cost functions and
perfect substitutes follows from Lemma 5 in Appendix 10.3. This lemma, which
assumes that K ′′′t ≤ 0, characterizes optimal prizes, conditional on weights.
Specifically, it gives conditions under which the principal should only use a sec-
ond period (first-period) prize. As in the case of quadratic cost functions, the
principal should rely only on a second-period prize if the precision of the first-
period signal is low. The assumption that K ′′′t ≤ 0 will turn out not to be a
serious restriction: Corollary 6 in Section 8 shows that K ′′′t ≤ 0 corresponds to
the case where feedback is optimal; if K ′′′t > 0, the principal should not give
feedback.
7.1.2 Imperfect Substitutes
For imperfect substitutes, it is more difficult to characterize the optimal pol-
icy for general cost functions. One can show (for K ′′′t ≤ 0) that the optimal
W1 conditional on η is zero whenever f1 (0) < ηC (η).29 Intutively, for any
given first-period weight, positive first-period prizes should be avoided when-
ever the first-period signal is sufficiently noisy, but second-period competitive-
ness is sufficiently high that second-period prizes are useful.
28If one of the performance measures is very precise (σt ≈ 0), then ∆EP ≈ 1.
29The result follows because W1 = W cannot be optimal with imperfect substitutes, and (51)




The following result generalizes an observation already made for quadratic cost
functions:
Proposition 4 With feedback, the optimal weight is positive for perfect and im-
perfect substitutes for all positive second-period prizesW2.
Theresult follows directly fromLemma 6 in theAppendix, according towhich
increasing η marginally from zero increases first-period efforts, while there is no
effect on second-period efforts. Proposition 4 states that performance evaluation
should always have memory: Firms should consider not only the recent perfor-
mance of employees, but also the performance in the distant past. As discussed
for Example E1 in Section 5, this holds because, for η = 0, the marginal effect
of η on first-period effort is positive and bounded away from zero (a first-order
effect), whereas it is zero for second-period effort (a second-order effect). To un-
derstand the latter point, note that increasing η has an adverse effect on second-
period efforts because the second-period contest becomes more asymmetric, that
is, less competitive (C ′ (η) < 0). As C ′ (0) = 0, this adverse effect vanishes as η
approaches 0.
As discussed in Section 2, several authors have argued that the principal
should use positive first-period weights. The proof of Lemma 6 shows that this is
even true for arbitrarily high first-period prizes. Moreover, it holds for imperfect
as well as perfect substitutes.
8 Feedback Policy
We now suppose the principal does not give feedback about first-period perfor-
mance. Section 8.1 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 8.2 compares the cases
with and without feedback. Generalizing existing results, we show that the op-
timal feedback policy depends only on the sign of the third derivative of the cost
function, with no difference for quadratic costs (C1). Hence, all results on the
optimal prize/weight policy with (C1) translate directly to the case without feed-
back. In Section 8.3, we sketch some results for more general cost functions in




Under the no-feedback policy, agents simultaneously choose first- and second-
period efforts according to
max
ei1≥0,ei2≥0




F2 (η (ei1 − ej1 + s) + ei2 − ej2) f1 (s) ds−K1 (ei1)−K2 (ei2) .
By Lemma 1(ii), the integral in (16) is the probability of winning the second-
period prize, conditional on effort choices. We can use this to characterize the
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose ρ = 0 (no feedback).
(i) In any symmetric interior Nash equilibrium, efforts must satisfy:




[f1 (0)W1 + ηW2C(η)] > 0 (17)




[W2C(η)] > 0. (18)
(ii) If the cost functions are sufficiently convex, (17) and (18) describe the unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium.30
Both effort levels reflect standard cost-benefit considerations. The marginal
benefit of first-period efforts consists of the increased winning probability in
period 2 (ηC(η)) and period 1 (f1 (0)).
8.2 The effects of feedback
By Propositions 1 and 5, first-period efforts in any symmetric equilibrium are
non-stochastic and equal under both feedback policies; we thuswrite e∗1 (η,W1,W2)
for first-period equilibrium efforts.31 Using Jensen’s inequality, we compare the
30In Appendix 10.5.2 we identify the meaning of “sufficient convexity”. We also show that the
second-order conditions hold locally for arbitrary convex cost function.
31The result reflects the fact that the marginal effect of first-period effort on the expected
second-period payoff is identical under both policies. Intuitively, a marginal increase of ei1 has
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expected second-period efforts in the equilibria characterized by Propositions 1
and 5:32
Lemma 3 ∀η ∈ R+,W1 < W :
(i) If K ′′′2 ≥ 0, then e∗2 (η,W −W1, 0) ≥ E (e∗2 (η,W −W1, 1)).
(ii) If K ′′′2 ≤ 0, then e∗2 (η,W −W1, 0) ≤ E (e∗2 (η,W −W1, 1)).
For quadratic costs, (i) and (ii) imply that expected second-period efforts are
equal under both feedback policies. Intuitively, K ′′′2 matters because second-
period efforts are the inverse of marginal costs for ρ = 0 and the expectation
of the inverse of marginal costs for ρ = 1. Thus, concavity (convexity) of the
inverse marginal costs is decisive for which regime yields higher efforts on ex-
pectation.33 A stark implication is that neither the other policy variables nor the
exogenous parameters matter for the optimal feedback policy. Intuitively, this
result should not hold when the third derivatives of cost functions switch sign;
then the relation between second-period efforts with and without feedback will
depend on details of the parameters and the policy.34 Moreover, even in the cur-
rent set-up the remaining parameters matter for the extent to which efforts with
and without feedback differ.35
A straightforward implication of Lemma 3 is that even if the principal has
chosen the optimal parameters for a given feedback policy, switching to the
positive effects on the second-period payoff of player i if it suffices to tip the balance in the contest
in period 2 in his favor. The probability that this happens, which is captured by C(η) for both
players, is independent of whether information on∆si1 is revealed to players before they choose
second-period efforts. In this argument, it is important to start from the respective equilibrium,
with equal efforts in both periods.
32Intuitively, with feedback, the agents base their second-period decisions on the revealed
asymmetry between players, whereas, without feedback, the expected asymmetry is decisive.
Compare second-period decisions with and without feedback for given effort choices in the first
period: For error realizations where the asymmetry is low (high) relative to expectations, efforts
will be higher (lower) with feedback than without.
33This result extends to non-separable cost functions if the third partial derivatives are positive
(negative) for all first-period efforts: This follows from copying the analysis of the second-period
game with the modified cost function,with e1 playing a dummy role.
34For instance, ifK ′′′
2
< 0 for small values of e1 andK ′′′2 > 0 for large values, one would expect
the results for very low prizes to be as if K ′′′
2
< 0 and those for very large prizes to be as if K ′′′
2
> 0.
35Trivially, for instance, when the second-period prize is small, the difference between the two
policies becomes negligible, whereas it can be substantial for more general policies.
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other feedback policy is beneficial if the corresponding condition onK ′′′2 holds.36
Hence, we have proven:
Corollary 6 The optimal feedback policy is the same for perfect and imperfect
substitutes, with ρ = 0 if K ′′′2 > 0 and ρ = 1 if K
′′′
2 < 0. For K
′′′
2 = 0, expected
payoffs are independent of the feedback policy.
The result extends Aoyagi (2010) who shows that, for one prize (W1 = 0)
and equal weights (η = 1) – the optimal parameters for Example E1 – the cost
function completely determines the optimal feedback policy.37 Our result shows
that this statement holds for arbitrary W1 and η.
8.3 Optimal Policy –BeyondQuadratic Costs
By Lemma 3, feedback has no effect on (expected) efforts for quadratic costs.
Thus, in this case, the results on prize and weight structure (Propositions 2 and 3)
also hold without feedback. Lemma 8 in the Appendix characterizes the optimal
prize structure without feedback for K ′′′t ≥ 0, where no feedback is superior
by Lemma 3. The interpretation of the general results is similar as for quadratic
costs: If the first-period contest is too noisy, it is optimal not to give a first-period
prize. Moreover, arguments analogous to those in the proof of Proposition 4
show that, starting from η = 0, a slight increase in η has a positive first-order
effect on e1, but only a second-order effect on e2. Hence, as in the case with
feedback, it is optimal in the no feedback case to give a positive weight on past
performance.
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes intertemporal effort provision in two-stage tournaments. A
principal with a fixed budget faces two risk-neutral agents. She observes noisy
effort signals in both periods. She aims at maximizing either total efforts (perfect
36To see this, note that Lemma 3 applies to all values of η and W1 and, in particular, to those
that maximize e∗
2
(η,W −W 1, 0) or E (e∗2 (η,W −W 1, 1)).
37Ederer (2010) also treats this case in his discussion of non-complementary abilities.
24
substitutes) or the product of first- and second-period efforts (imperfect substi-
tutes). She decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii)
how to weigh performance in the two periods in the second period prize, and
(iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period.
Prize and weight policies differ in their incentive effects, even though they
seem similar at first sight. Ourmain results characterize the optimal combination
of prizes and weights in terms of exogenous parameters, depending on whether
efforts are perfect or imperfect substitutes. The analysis shows that, even when a
principal can divide the prize arbitrarily, it is usually better to give only a second-
period prize and rely on performance weights to incentivize first-period weights.
We also show that the effects of different incentive structures can be quite sub-
stantial.
Several extensions are conceivable. First, one might ask, by going beyond the
current model, what a rationale for using multiple prizes might be. Risk aversion
is a natural candidate. Second, one might subject the hypotheses of our analysis
to empirical tests.38
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10 Appendix
10.1 Behavior of the Agents39
10.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Equilibrium efforts must be positive because f2 > 0 by Assumption 2 andK ′2 (0)= 0
by Assumption 1. Since f2 is symmetric by Assumption 2 and
− (η∆s11+∆e12)= η∆s21+∆e22,
the left-hand side of the first-order condition (2) is equal for both agents. Hence, the
second-period efforts are the same for both agents. Thus, (2) becomes f2 (η∆si1)W2=
K ′2 (ei2). AsK ′′2> 0 by Assumption 1,K ′2 is strictly increasing and thus invertible. Thus
(3) must hold in any equilibrium.
(ii) The following inequality guarantees that the second-period payoffs (1) of player
i are strictly concave in ei2:
f ′2 (η∆si1+∆ei2)W2 < K
′′
2 (ei2) ∀ ∆si1∈ R, ei2, ej2∈ R+. (19)
(19) requiresK2 to be sufficiently convex.40 If it holds globally, the first-order conditions
(2) characterize a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium is unique, as (3) must hold
in any equilibrium by Part (i) of the lemma.
10.1.2 Proof of Corollary 1












39The proofs in this section generalize Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010) (for non-
complementary abilities) who assume W1 = 0 and η = 1.




+∆ei2) < 0 if η∆si1 +∆ei2 > 0, so that (19) always holds in
this case. For the case that η∆si1 + ∆ei2 < 0, suppose f ′2 is bounded above. Then (19) holds
globally if K ′′
2
































By Assumption 1, K ′′2> 0. By Assumption 2, if ∆si1< (>)0 ∧ η > 0 ∧W 2> 0, then
ηf ′2 (η∆si1)< 0 and thus
∂ei2
∂∆si1
> (<)0 . This implies that ei2 is decreasing in |∆si1|.
Similar arguments show that ∂ei2
∂η
< 0. Since f2> 0 by Assumption 2, we have ∂ei2∂W 2> 0.
10.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1




for symmetric first-period efforts. This allows us






= ηW 2C(η) (23)

































Using these equations in (24) and inserting ∆ei2= 0, we obtain
dU si2
d∆si1

























−1 (f2 (η (∆ei1+s))W2)





































= ηW 2A− ηW 22B. (25)




f2 (ηt) f1 (t−∆ei1) dt+
∫ ∞
0
f2 (ηt) f1 (t−∆ei1) dt.
Let u = −t. Symmetry of f1 and f2 by Assumption 2 implies f2 (ηt)= f2 (ηu) and
f1 (t−∆ei1)= f1 (u+∆ei1). Hence,
∫ 0
−∞
f2 (ηt) f1 (t−∆ei1) dt =
∫ ∞
0






f2 (ηu) f1 (u+∆ei1) du+
∫ ∞
0




f2 (ηt) [f1 (t+∆ei1)+f 1 (t−∆ei1)] dt.






















Again using u = −t and appealing to symmetry, f2 (ηt)=f2 (ηu), f ′2 (ηt)=−f ′2 (ηu)




































































With ∆ei1= 0, we obtain (23).
Together, (6) and Lemma 4 imply
f1 (0)W1+ηW 2C(η) = K
′
1 (ei1) .
By Assumption 1, K ′1 is invertible. We thus obtain (9) as a necessary condition for any
symmetric interior PBE.
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(ii) By Lemma 2(ii) (2) implies sequential rationality in the second period. From the
discussion at the beginning of Section 4.1, beliefs are consistent.
As K ′1(0) = 0 by Assumption 1, efforts must be positive in any symmetric equilib-
rium. Thus, by Part (i), (9) is a necessary condition for an equilibrium. The second-order




< K ′′1 (ei1) ∀ei1, ej1∈ R+. (27)
Inserting (26) in (27) gives




















) ds < K ′′1 (ei1) .
The left-hand side of this inequality is decreasing in K ′′2 , while the right-hand side is
increasing in K ′′1 . For given policy parameters and distributions such that the slopes of
f1 and f2 are bounded, (28) therefore holds as long asK ′′1 and K ′′2 are sufficently large.
If these conditions hold globally, (9) thus describes an equilibrium, which is the unique
symmetric equilibrium.
10.1.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Symmetry of the equilibrium implies ∆si1= ∆εi1. Hence, (3) implies





Taking the expectation over ∆εi1, we obtain
E∆εi1 (e
∗





(f2 (ηs)W2) f1 (s) ds.
From the symmetry of the density by Assumption 2, we get (10).
10.1.5 Proof of Corollary 3
Part 1: Auxilliary Results
33



































































As s = −σt (the solution to f ′′t (s) = 0 and f ′′′t (s) < 0) maximizes f ′t (x), we obtain
























































With (29), we get ∫ ∞
0






























dt and noting that
∫∞
0










































































Part 2: Second-Order Conditions
Next, we derive sufficient conditions for the second-order conditions to hold.41 Using
K ′′t (eit)=k, (19) simplifies to
f ′2 (x)W2< k ∀x ∈ R (37)







41We only consider the second-order conditions for the full revelation case.
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Similarly, (28) can be written as

















1 (s− x)] ds < k













































































































Part 3: Characterizing the equilibrium




(35) in (9) and (10) yields (11) and (12).
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10.2 Prizes vs. Weights: An illustration
10.2.1 Proof of Observation 1
(i)The statement for the pure prize policy withW1= W follows directly from Corollary












2 = 1 /σ1
and (11). The result for for e2 and η → ∞ follows from (12). (ii) These two policies are
equivalent by definition. The result follows from Corollary 3 (ii).
10.2.2 Proof of Observation 2









2π . The result on prize poli-
cies thus follows from σ1= σ2= σ. A pure weight policy with W2= W and weight





















2 , which implies the result for pure weight policies.
10.3 Results for Perfect Substitutes
We now prove the results discussed in Subsections 6.1 and 7.1.1. In Lemma 5, we derive
the optimal prize structure (conditional on the weight η) for the case thatK1 andK2 are
not necessarily quadratic (as discussed in Subsection 7.1.1). The result will rely on the
Assumption thatK ′′′t ≤ 0.42 Then, we will use Lemma 5 to prove the results discussed in
Subsection 6.1. We will first show how Proposition 2 for K ′′′t = 0 follows from Lemma
5 and then derive Corollary 4.
In the following, for perfect substitutes, we will denote the optimal choice of η con-
ditional on W1 and ρ as ηP (W1, ρ) and the optimal choice of W1 conditional on η as
W P1 (η, ρ).
42This is not a serious restriction: Corollary 6 in Section 8 will show that K ′′′
2
≤ 0 is the case
in which it is optimal to give feedback.
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10.3.1 General costs
Lemma 5 Suppose K ′′′t ≤ 0 for t = 1, 2. For η> 0,WP1 (η, 1)=0 (WP1 (η, 1)= W ) if
and only if















Proof. Using (9) and (10) in (13) gives










(f2 (ηs) (W −W 1)) f1 (s) ds.
This yields
















−1 (f2 (ηs) (W −W 1))
]ds,
and hence






























−1 (f2 (ηs) (W −W 1))
])3 .
Since K ′′t > 0, K ′′′t ≤ 0 implies ∂
2V P (η,W 1,1)
(∂W 1)
2 ≥ 0. Thus, there is no interior optimum.
For W 1=0 and W 1=W , the principal’s expected payoffs are







(f2 (ηs)W ) f1 (s) ds;
V P (η,W, 1) = (K ′1)
−1
(f1 (0)W ) .
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Therefore,








(f2 (ηs)W ) f1 (s) ds− (K ′1)
−1
(f1 (0)W ) .
Hence, V P (η, 0, 1)−V P (η,W, 1)> (<)0 if and only if (42) holds.
10.3.2 Quadratic Costs: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof relies heavily on the following result:
Lemma 6 SupposeW1< W . Then,
(i) ∂e∗1 (η,W 1,W −W 1) /∂η |η=0 > 0.
(ii) ∂E (e∗2 (η,W −W 1, 1)) /∂η |η=0=0.
Proof. (i) From (9),
∂e∗1 (η,W 1,W −W 1)
∂η
=




−1 (f1 (0)W1+η (W −W 1)C (η))
] . (44)
Hence,


























> 0 provided W1< W .
(ii) From (10),
























−1 (f2 (0) (W −W 1))
]ds =0,
where the second equality follows from f ′2 (0)= 0.
We now prove the proposition:
(i) WithK ′′′t = 0, Lemma 5 implies thatW P1 (η) always is a boundary solution, with










C (η). Hence, if the inequality is satisfied for
some η, then total effort for this η andW1= 0 is higher than forW1= W , which shows
that W1= W cannot be optimal. In this case, since there is no interior optimum by
Lemma 5, W1= 0 is optimal.43
From (13),
∂V P (η,W 1, 1)
∂η
=
∂e∗1 (η,W 1,W −W 1)
∂η
+
∂E (e∗2 (η1,W −W 1, 1))
∂η
(46)
Using (C1) and (7) to simplify (44) and (45), (46) becomes














= 0 and rearranging gives (14).








10.3.3 Normal-Quadratic Example: Proof of Corollary 4





















as a necessary condition, which is uniquely





> 0. Since the optimal η must be strictly positive by
Lemma 6 and since the solution to the necessary condition is unique and positive, the





∀W 1< W . Next, we show
43This can also be derived from Proposition 8.
40
that W P1 = 0. By Corollary 2, W P1 = 0 if ∃η such that f1 (0)< (1 + η)C (η). From




2 + σ22< σ1
√
2π (1 + η)⇐⇒ 2η > σ22 /σ21 − 1. In particular, this holds







10.4 Results for Imperfect Substitutes
Wenowprove the results discussed in Subsection 6.2. After some preliminary calculation
for the case of general cost functions, we prove Proposition 3 for the quadratic case.
Finally, we deal with the normal-quadratic example. For imperfect substitutes, we denote
the optimal choice of η conditional on W1 and ρ as ηI(W1, ρ) and the optimal choice
of W1 conditional on η as W I1 (η, ρ).
10.4.1 General Costs: Preliminary Calculations
The expected payoff of the principal is
V I (η1,W 1, 1)= e
∗
1 (η1,W −W 1, 1) · E (e∗2 (η2,W −W 1, 1)) . (48)
Using (9) and (10) in (48) yields










(f2 (ηs) (W −W 1)) f1 (s) ds.
Using (49), we have
∂V I (η,W 1, 1)
∂W 1
= (50)






















∂2V I (η,W 1, 1)
(∂W 1)
2 = (51)
















(f2 (ηs) (W −W 1)) f1 (s) ds































(f2 (ηs) (W −W 1))
]
f1 (s) ds.
10.4.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof requires an auxilliary result.
Lemma 7 Suppose (C1) holds. For all η > 0,W I1 (η)> 0 if and only if f1 (0)> 2ηC (η).
In this case
W I1 (η)= W
f1 (0)− 2ηC (η)
2f1 (0)− 2ηC (η)
> 0.





> 0, that is, using (53), if





< 0 or, equiv-
alently, f1 (0)< 2ηC (η), first note that (53) implies









is monotone in W1.
With (C1), (49) yields
V I (η,W 1)=
(W −W 1)C (η)
k1k2
(f1 (0)W1+η (W −W 1)C (η)) . (52)
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Thus


















< 0 for all W1 ≤ W2 and thus W I1 (η)= 0. To see that W1= 0





= 0 or, equivalently, f1 (0)= 2ηC (η), note that




< 0, so that ∂V
I(η,W 1)
∂W 1






> 0, the first-order condition ∂V
I(η,W 1)
∂W 1










> 0, f1 (0)> 2ηC (η)
0, f1 (0)≤ 2ηC (η)
(54)
We can now prove Part (i) of Proposition 3. (54) shows thatW I1 must correspond to
one of the two cases mentioned in Proposition 3. To complete the proof, we derive the
first-order condition for ηI (W1) for these two cases. From (49), we obtain
∂V I (η,W 1)
∂η
=
(W −W 1)2 C (η)
k1k2
(
C (η) + ηC ′(η)
)
+ (55)
(W −W 1)C ′ (η)
k1k2
(f1 (0)W1+η (W −W 1)C (η)) .





(C (η))2 +2ηC (η)C ′(η)
C (η)2+2ηC (η)C ′(η)− f 1 (0)C ′ (η)
. (56)
According to Lemma 7, W1= 0 is a necessary condition for an optimum with f1 (0)≤
2ηC(η). Inserting W1= 0 in (56) gives the first-order condition η = − C(η)2C′(η) , which
corresponds to Proposition 3(a). Analogously,W1= W f1(0)−2ηC(η)2f1(0)−2ηC(η) is a necessary con-









which corresponds to Proposition 3(b).
10.4.3 Normal-Quadratic Example: Proof of Corollary 5
(35) and (36) yield










> 0 ∀ η.
This is inconsistentwith |C ′ (η) /C (η) | = |C (η) /f1 (0) | as for η > 0, |C ′ (η) /C (η) | =
|C (η) /f1 (0) | is equivalent to C (η)2 +C ′ (η) f1 (0)= 0. Therefore, according to
Proposition 3(ii)(b),W I1> 0 cannot apply. Hence, Proposition (3)(ii) gives |C ′ (η) /C (η) |= 1 /2η
as the necessary condition for ηI . Using (35) and (36), this can bewritten as |ησ21 /σ22+σ21η2 | =
1/2η , which is solved by ηI=σ2 /σ1 .
10.5 The role of feedback
We now provide additional material concerning Section 8. We prove the equilibrium
characterization for the no feedback case, Proposition 5. We then discuss second-order
conditions. Next we prove Lemma 3, which compares the policies with and without
feedback. Finally, we characterize the optimal prize policy in the absence of feedback.
10.5.1 Proof of Proposition 5










f2 (η (∆ei1+s)+∆ei2) f1 (s) ds=K
′
2 (ei2)








Inverting K ′1 and K ′2 yields (17) and (18).
(ii) First-period equilibrium efforts are positive because η ≥ 0 and K ′1(0) = 0 by As-
sumption 1. Equilibrium efforts in the second period are positive becauseW2C(η) > 0
by Assumption 2. By part (i), (17) and (18) are necessary equilibrium conditions.





f ′2 (η (∆ei1+s)+∆ei2) f1 (s) ds < K
′′




f ′2 (η (∆ei1+s)+∆ei2) f1 (s) ds

















If these conditions hold globally, the expected payoff of player i is a strictly concave
function of (ei1, ei2), so that (17) and (18) describe best responses, and thus characterize
a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, this is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
10.5.2 Discussing Second-Order Conditions (No feedback)
Global Second-Order Conditions We first show that (57) and (58) hold for given
policy parameters and distributions as long as Kt is sufficiently convex for t = 1, 2.
For (57), this is obvious, as the right-hand side is increasing in K1′′ (). To see that the












f ′2 (η (∆ei1+s)+∆ei2) f1 (s) ds
44(57) is the condition that expected payoffs are strictly concave in (ei1); (58) is the condition
that the Hessian of the expected payoff function has strictly positive determinant.
45
With this notation, (58) can be written as
K ′′1 (ei1) ·A+K ′′2 (ei2) ·B + C ≤ K ′′1 (ei1)K ′′2 (ei2) (59)
To prove that (58) holds for sufficiently convex cost functions, suppose it does not hold
for some pair of cost function K̃1 and K̃2. Let K̂t (e)=K̃t (e)+κ2e
2. Then (59) for K̂1
and K̂2 is
K̃ ′′1 (ei1) ·A+K̃ ′′2 (ei2) ·B + C ≤ (60)




K̃ ′′1 (ei1) + K̃
′′
2 (ei2)− A− B
)
+κ2
For all A and B, the right-hand side of this inequality can be made arbitrarily high by
increasing κ, so that the inequality is satisfied and thus (58) holds.
Local Second-OrderConditions In the symmetric equilibrium,∆ei1=∆ei2= 0.





f ′2 (ηs) f1 (s) ds < K
′′









f ′2 (ηs) f1 (s) ds ≤ 1. (62)
By Assumption 2, f1 (s)= f 1 (−s) and f ′2 (ηs)= −f ′2 (−ηs). This implies that∫∞
−∞ f
′
2 (ηs) f1 (s) ds = 0. Thus, the left-hand sides of (61) and (62) are all 0 and the
inequalities hold automatically.
10.5.3 Feedback Policy: Proof of Lemma 3 45
(10) and (18) imply
e∗2 (η,W −W 1, 0)−E (e∗2 (η,W −W 1, 1))=
(K ′2)
−1





(f2 (ηs) (W −W 1)) f1 (s) ds.
45The proof resembles Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010) (case with non-complementary abili-
ties), but allows for W1 > 0 and η 6= 1.
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(f2 (ηs) (W −W 1)) f1 (s) ds.












(g (s)) f1 (s) ds.
According to Jensen’s inequality, this expression is weakly negative (weakly positive) if
(K ′2)
−1 is convex (concave), which is the case if and only ifK ′2 is concave (convex), that
is, K ′′′2 ≤ 0 (K ′′′2 ≥ 0).
10.5.4 Optimal prizes with general cost functions
For the no feedback case, we again restrict the third derivative of the cost functions in
such a way that the feedback policy is optimal by Corollary 6.
Lemma 8 Suppose K ′′′t ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2. For all η > 0





















(iii) If neither (63) nor (64) holds,WP1 ∈ [0,W ].
Proof. Using (17) and (18) in (13) gives
V P (η,W 1, 0)= (65)
(K ′1)
−1
(f1 (0)W1+η (W −W 1)C(η))+ (K ′2)
−1
((W −W 1)C (η)) .
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This yields












−1 ((W −W 1)C (η))
]
and

























−1 ((W −W 1)C (η))
])3
Since K ′′t > 0, K ′′′t ≥ 0 implies ∂
2V P (η,W 1,0)
(∂W 1)
2 ≤ 0.
(i) Thus, the principal will set W 1=0 provided
















(ii) She will set W 1=W provided













incentives relative to the unconstrained case. To make up for this, she has to
adjust the weight of first-period performance downwards.
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